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April 22, 2015 
 
We report a controlled laboratory experiment examining risk-taking and information aggregation 
in groups facing a common risk. The experiment allows us to examine how subjects respond to 
new information, in the form of both privately observed signals and signals reported from others. 
We find that a considerable number of subjects exhibit ‘reverse confirmation bias’: they place 
less weight on information from others that agrees with their private signal and more weight on 
conflicting information. We also find a striking degree of consensus when subjects make 
decisions on behalf of the group under a random dictatorship procedure. Reverse confirmation 
bias and the incidence of consensus are considerably reduced when group members can share 
signals but not communicate. 
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Risk Taking and Information Aggregation in Groups 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the key functions of deliberating groups is the bringing together of people who have 
independently obtained information on a common risk. When such groups effectively aggregate 
information from different members, this allows the members to respond better to the risk. But is 
this a faithful representation of how people share and process information in groups? How do 
people actually use information received from others? We present a controlled laboratory 
experiment that investigates this question with respect to decisions under risk over monetary 
earnings. 
Previous economic experiments on group decision-making under risk show that when all 
members of a group have the same probabilistic information, group decisions often differ from 
what group members would have decided individually. We extend this literature by focusing on 
an experimental setting where each group member has private prior information about a common 
risk. In such a setting individual group members can benefit from updating these priors using 
information conveyed through group interaction. Previous research has shown that individuals 
often update priors in a way that is incompatible with Bayesian updating (see Camerer, 1995 for 
a review). Moreover, an extensive literature in social psychology documents important group 
effects in the way individuals process information obtained from group deliberation (e.g. Stoner, 
1961; Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969). An important distinction between our design and this 
literature is that we introduce heterogeneous information in a controlled fashion. In this 
controlled laboratory environment, we investigate how private information is aggregated to 
influence individual decisions and how an individual decides on behalf of a group. 
The experiment is divided into four stages. In each stage, subjects make an investment 
decision whose outcome depends on a binary state of the world variable. In stage I subjects make 
individual decisions knowing that both states are equally likely ex ante. At the beginning of stage 
II subjects receive a private signal about the state of the world, and then make another individual 
decision. At the beginning of stage III we randomly form groups in which subjects can share 
their private information with two others, and then a single decision is made for the group by a 
randomly selected group-member. How the group interaction in stage III proceeds depends on 
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the treatment. In our COMM treatment, subjects communicate with fellow group members 
through unrestricted free-form electronic chat; in our NO-COMM treatment, subjects interact 
only by reporting their private signals to fellow group members. Finally, in stage IV subjects 
make decisions based on the same information they had in stage III, but this time a subject’s 
decision is a purely individual decision, i.e. it is not observed by other subjects and it cannot 
affect their payoffs.  
Controlling for the probabilistic information that subjects receive in various stages allows 
us to measure how strongly their preferred choice under risk responds to this information. We are 
particularly interested in whether subjects’ response depends on the source of information: a 
privately observed signal or information provided by a fellow group member. Comparing 
decisions in stages I and II allows us to observe how subjects react to privately observed signals, 
while comparing individual choices from stages II and IV allow us to examine how subjects 
respond to information received from others. 
Finally, choices from stages III and IV allow us to compare choices on behalf of the 
group with choices on behalf of oneself. In stage III, when subjects decide on behalf of their 
group, we do not force them to reach a consensus with others. Instead, we use a random 
dictatorship procedure, which incentivizes subjects to reveal their own preferred level of risk-
taking for the group. This procedure delivers easily interpretable “group choices” made by 
individual subjects and has the advantage of eliminating strategic considerations associated with 
other group decision-making processes.1  
We find that subjects generally respond intuitively to information they receive privately. 
Subjects also readily share their signals with their group – there is no systematic evidence of 
strategic reporting. We cannot reject the hypothesis that many of our subjects act in line with 
rational Bayesian updating. Note that with Bayesian updating we refer here to the joint 
hypothesis of fully trusting signals reported by other players and using this information to update 
one’s priors. For subjects who receive two conflicting signals from fellow group members, we 
find that about half of subjects leaves their decision under risk unchanged. This is in line with 
taking the reports at face value and updating subjective beliefs using Bayes’ rule. However, the 
                                                            
1
 Our random dictatorship procedure may also reduce the disproportionate influence of group members with 
particular risk preferences or personalities that is found in other studies. For example, Ertac and Gurdal (2012) find 
that men who express a preference to be a group leader (decide on behalf of a group) are more risk seeking than men 
who do not. Nieboer (2013) reports that all-female groups do not take more risk than female individuals whereas all-
male groups take significantly more risk than male individuals when groups decide by consensus. 
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other half of the subjects who receive two conflicting signals change their decision. This may 
reflect a violation of rational Bayesian updating, or it may reflect a mistrust in the signal reports 
of others. Interestingly, when subjects can freely communicate (treatment COMM), we see a 
systematic bias towards changing one’s decision away from the direction predicted by their 
private signal. We refer to this behavior as ‘reverse confirmation bias’. Without free-form 
communication (treatment NO-COMM), changes in risk taking are equally likely to occur in 
either direction.  
We also find treatment differences in the group decision-making stage. In the COMM 
treatment, the majority of the subjects make the same decision as fellow group members. This 
degree of consensus is remarkable given the absence of any monetary or reputational 
incentives for reaching consensus. In the final stage, approximately half of the subjects make 
the same choice that they made in the group-decision making stage. This pattern of decisions 
is consistent with the explanation of consensus at the group stage as driven by persuasive 
arguments by peer subjects. However, given that half of the subjects make different choices in 
these stages we cannot exclude that social preferences over risk play a role. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we review 
related studies in psychology and economics. In section 3 we describe our experiment and in 
section 4 we present our results. We conclude in section 5. 
2. Related Literature 
2.1. Information Aggregation 
Both economists and psychologists have investigated the question of how groups aggregate 
information. Theories of information aggregation go back at least as far as the famous jury 
theorem of Condorcet (1785). Recent theoretical contributions to the literature on committee 
voting by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) show that 
incentives to vote strategically can lead to group members voting against their private 
information, thus hampering efficient information aggregation.2 Experiments in this paradigm 
confirm the occurrence of strategic voting (Guarnaschelli et al., 2000; Ali et al., 2008), 
                                                            
2
 This result is reminiscent of the literature on herding and information cascades, in which the decision-maker may 
also find herself in the position where publicly received information (through observing others’ actions) overrides 
her private signal (see Banerjee, 1992; Bikchandani et al., 1992; Anderson and Holt, 1996). 
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although this is less of a concern when group members can communicate (Goeree and Yariv, 
2011).  
Experimental evidence from social psychology suggests that group interaction often 
leads to decisions that are extreme compared to the preferences of individual group members. 
Group interaction may produce choice shifts (Stoner, 1961) or group polarization (Moscovici 
and Zavalloni, 1969). The way in which groups aggregate information, specifically the 
persuasiveness of certain arguments, can play an important role in this process (Vinokur and 
Burstein, 1974). More recently, Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) and Sobel (2014) theoretically 
investigate the group polarization phenomenon in the framework of Bayesian rationality, 
demonstrating that both Bayesian and non-Bayesian rational behavior can explain extreme 
outcomes in groups. These approaches have the advantage that they quantify the strength (in 
probabilistic terms) of pieces of information, which allows for precise predictions of behavior. 
Our experiment also follows this approach. 
Bayesian-rational models of group interaction like Sobel’s (2014) typically assume 
that groups efficiently aggregate probabilistic information held by their members, but, as 
argued by Glaeser and Sunstein (2009), this assumption may often not be warranted. Sure 
enough, experimental evidence suggests that groups are better than individuals at using 
probabilistic information when the group receives this information exogenously as a 
collective (see Blinder and Morgan, 2005; Charness et al., 2007).3 But, outside the literature 
on committee voting discussed earlier, decision-making based on endogenous information 
sharing in groups has received little attention. A key question is how people weight 
information depending on how they obtained it. McKelvey and Page (1990) present an 
experiment in which subjects receive private information in the first round of the experiment, 
followed by public information with which to update their beliefs in subsequent rounds. 
Although subjects do use the public information provided to adjust their beliefs, they are slow 
to update their beliefs away from their private information. Given that the experimental 
design ensures that both types of information have the same strength, private information is 
thus relatively overweighted. 
                                                            
3
 Note that groups are ‘better’ than individuals in the sense that they obtain higher pay-offs in a task that rewards 
them for greater accuracy. Unlike the investment choice in our experiment, which elicits subjective judgments or 
preferences, the tasks used by Blinder and Morgan and Charness et al. are purely intellective – there is an objective 
correct answer. Experimental evidence on strictly intellective tasks shows that groups perform better than 
individuals, provided certain conditions of ‘demonstrability’ are met (Laughlin and Ellis, 1986; Laughlin, 1999). 
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One way of interpreting the results of McKelvey and Page is as a manifestation of 
confirmation bias, the “seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing 
beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” (Nickerson, 1998, p. 175). In McKelvey and 
Page’s experiment, existing beliefs may be shaped by the source of the information (e.g. 
private versus public) or by the order in which information is delivered (e.g. earlier versus 
later). First, evidence from psychology experiments on information sharing in groups suggests 
that commonly known information is more persuasive than private information in group 
discussions, but that private information is rated more highly if it is known to the decision 
maker prior to the discussion instead of learned from a fellow group member (Van Swol, 
2007; Van Swol et al., 2003). A second factor is the order in which information is received. 
Most of the evidence from experiments on probabilistic information supports the existence of 
a primacy effect (in line with confirmation bias): probabilistic information received earlier has 
a bigger impact on beliefs than information received later (Hoch, 1984; Peterson and 
Ducharme, 1967; Pitz, 1969; although note the opposite recency effect reported in Hertwig et 
al., 2004). The effect of early information appears to be stronger when people make a decision 
after receiving the early information, instead of continuing to parse the information (Jonas et 
al., 2001). Finally, groups seem to place the same importance on early information as 
individuals do (Mancuso et al., 2014; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2001). 
2.2. Decisions under Risk in Social Contexts 
Our experiment is also related to the experimental literature on decision-making under risk in 
social contexts, which can be broadly divided into two strands. First, there is a growing body 
of laboratory research comparing decisions of groups and individuals. Results from these 
experiments suggest that the decisions of groups and individuals often diverge, although the 
evidence on direction and nature of the difference is mixed. The experiments of Sutter (2007; 
2009) and subsequent replications show that groups deciding under consensus take more risk 
than individuals in the investment task introduced by Gneezy and Potters (1997), whether groups 
communicate face to face (Nieboer, 2013) or by electronic chat (Bougheas et al., 2013). Two 
experimental studies that also investigate group decision by consensus but use a different risk-
taking task – the multiple price list format introduced by Holt and Laury (2002) – show that 
group choices are more extreme than individuals’ at the low end (more safe choices) and high 
end (more risky choices) of the probability scale (Baker et al., 2008; Shupp and Williams, 2008). 
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It should be noted that both sets of findings are consistent with groups making choices more in 
line with risk neutrality than individuals. Finally, three experimental studies that use a group 
voting mechanism and the Holt-Laury task report more mixed results. Masclet et al. (2009) 
find that groups, deciding by multiple-round unanimous vote, are more risk averse than 
individuals. Zhang and Casari (2012) use a communication stage followed by three rounds of 
unanimous voting; they report that group choices are more risk neutral than individuals’ choices. 
Harrison et al. (2013) use a simple majority vote and find no difference between groups and 
individuals. 
The second strand of experimental literature on decision-making in social contexts 
suggests that people are often influenced by the choices of their peers. The direction of such 
peer effects seems to depend on the experimental context. Yechiam et al. (2008) report an 
experiment in which mutual real-time observation between two individuals whilst making 
choices under risk leads to higher risk taking. In a multi-period design with feedback on peer 
choices, Cooper and Rege (2011) find that subjects are significantly more likely to change 
their preferred level of risk taking if it deviates from the majority choice of peers. Lahno and 
Serra-Garcia (2012) also find evidence of peer effects on binary individual choices under risk. 
Finally, Bougheas et al. (2013) report significant convergence in the risk taking of individuals 
when they are allowed to freely communicate with each other about an individual decision 
under risk. 
3. The Experiment 
We begin by describing our experimental design and procedures in section 3.1, before 
discussing some key features of this design and the hypotheses it enables us to address in 
section 3.2. 
3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures 
All sessions of the experiment were carried out at the CeDEx computer laboratory at the 
University of Nottingham (Nottingham, UK). Subjects were students from various disciplines, 
who had previously registered for participation in economic experiments and were recruited 
via ORSEE recruitment software (Greiner, 2004). Eight sessions were conducted in May 
2010, with 84 subjects participating in treatment COMM. In March 2015 we ran a further NO-
COMM treatment consisting of four sessions with 96 subjects. 
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At the start of a session, subjects were randomly assigned a seat in the laboratory. 
They then received instructions, which were also read out loud by an experimenter.4 Subjects 
were informed that there would be four stages and their earnings would be based on decisions 
in one of the four stages, to be picked at random. To make this random selection process 
completely transparent, the experimenter asked a volunteer subject to publicly perform a 
double-blind draw from a set of four playing cards (Ace, Two, Three and Four – shown to all 
subjects in advance of the draw) and put the selected card in a box in a publicly visible place. 
The card was retrieved and displayed to the subjects at the end of the session. Similarly, 
subjects were informed that earnings in a stage would depend on which of two states of the 
world is realized. Again, the experimenter asked a volunteer to perform a double-blind draw 
to select one of the states. Specifically, subjects were shown two sets of cards: set A 
(henceforth ‘the bad state’) consisted of two red Aces of Hearts and one Ace of Spades while 
set B (henceforth ‘the good state’) consisted of two Aces of Spades and one Ace of Hearts. 
The sets were placed in identical packs that were put into an empty bag for selection by the 
volunteer subject. At the end of the experiment subjects were shown the entire contents of the 
selected pack and so learned whether the state of the world was good or bad.  
Subjects then received specific instructions for each stage in turn. Throughout the 
experiment subjects were not allowed to communicate with one another, except in Stage III as 
described below, and all choices were submitted in private via the software.  
In each stage subjects make an investment choice about how much of a £10 
endowment to invest. In the bad state the subject loses her investment and in the good state 
she gets a positive return. The returns are given in Table 1.5 We thus have a non-linear version 
of the investment task introduced in Potters and Gneezy (1997) with a discrete choice set of 
11 options. 
 
[ Table 1 here ] 
 
                                                            
4
 The experimental software was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The experimental instructions are 
reproduced in the appendix. 
5
 In the experiment we used a neutral frame that does not refer to investments, endowments, losses or gains, but 
simply lists the eleven options and corresponding earnings. See appendix. 
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In stage I subjects choose from the options listed in Table 1, only knowing that the two 
states of the world are equally likely to have been selected. The amounts in the table are 
constructed so that the optimal investment is £5 for a risk-neutral subject, leaving room for 
such a subject to increase or decrease her investment as she receives information about the 
state of the world.  
At the beginning of stage II each subject receives a private signal s ∈ {good, bad}, 
where Pr{good signal | good state} = Pr{bad signal | bad state} = 2/3. The signal was thus 
informative about the true state of the world. This signal was implemented by allowing each 
subject to draw a card (with replacement) from the selected set. A draw of a black (red) card 
corresponds to receiving a good (bad) signal. Subjects then make another choice from the 
options listed in Table 1. 
Stage III starts with the random formation of groups of three subjects by the 
experimental software. Subjects are told about the groups and that they can anonymously 
interact with the two other group members, although the type of interaction depends on the 
experimental treatment. In treatment COMM, group members can communicate freely using 
an electronic chat box on their screen. During the chat subjects can, if they want, report their 
individual signals to others in the group. In treatment NO-COMM, subjects can only report a 
signal to others – there is no other way of communicating to others. Subjects are reminded of 
their private signal and are asked to report a signal to others. They are aware that the software 
will display their reported signal to the others in the group. 
After the group interaction, each subject chooses again from the options listed in Table 
1. These decisions are made on behalf of the group and are implemented by a ‘random 
dictatorship’ procedure: in each group one of the group members’ decisions is randomly 
chosen to be the one that is relevant for all three group members. At the end of this stage all 
group members are informed of the three choices and which one is implemented. 
In stage IV each subject makes a final investment decision, again by choosing from the 
options in Table 1. Like the decisions in stages I and II, this is a purely individual decision: it 
is not observed by other subjects and it only affects the decision-maker.  
At the end of the experiment the state of the world is revealed, the earnings-relevant 
stage is revealed and subjects are paid accordingly in private. Average subject earnings for the 
experiment were £10.29 and the average session time was 40 minutes. 
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3.2 Hypotheses 
3.2.1. Individual Decisions 
In stage I, subjects make individual investment choices where the state of the world is equally 
likely to be good or bad. Choices from this stage thus give us a measure of individual 
subjects’ willingness to take risk. 
In stages II and III, subjects receive information about the true state of the world. In 
general, after receiving g good signals and b bad signals, rational Bayesian updating implies 
that the probability of the good state is given by  
 
Pr{good state | b, g} = Pr{b, g | good state} × Pr{good state} / Pr{b, g} = 1/(1 + 2b – g). 
 
Note that in our design this probability only depends on the difference between the 
number of bad and good signals. Note also that the use of this formula implies that all signals 
are taken at face value (i.e. subjects trust that others report their signals truthfully). 
Thus, Bayesian updating in stage II implies that a subject receiving a good signal 
updates her subjective probability of the good state from 1/2 to 2/3, while a subject receiving 
a bad signal updates her subjective probability of the good state from 1/2 to 1/3. The 
behavioral prediction in line with Bayesian updating is that subjects who receive a good (bad) 
signal will keep constant or increase (decrease) their investment. 
In stages III and IV, individuals may use information on private signals obtained from 
the group interaction in stage III. Assuming that group members truthfully report their private 
signal and this is common knowledge, Bayesian updating implies that the subjective 
probability that a subject attaches to the good state is given by 
 
Pr{good state | g=0, b=3 } = 1/9; 
Pr{good state | g=1, b=2 } = 1/3; 
Pr{good state | g=2, b=1 } = 2/3; 
 Pr{good state | g=3, b=0 } = 8/9. 
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We use these probabilities to generate a set of predictions for investment in stage IV (the final 
individual decision) relative to stage II. As before, the prediction of decision-making 
consistent with Bayesian updating is that those subjects for whom the probability of the good 
state increases (decreases) will keep constant or increase (decrease) their investment from 
stage II to IV.  
Note that the probabilities of the good state in groups with mixed signals are the same 
as the probabilities of the good state after a single signal (Pr{good state|g=0, b = 1}= Pr{good 
state| g=1, b = 2}=1/3, and Pr{good state|g=1, b = 0}= Pr{good state| g=2, b = 1}=2/3). For 
two out of three members of such groups, the subjective probability of the good state will not 
change between stages II and IV: the conflicting signals they receive from fellow group 
members effectively cancel each other out. If subjects were instead prone to confirmation 
bias, they interpret two conflicting signals in a different way. According to confirmation bias, 
a subject places more weight on new evidence that confirms her own. As a consequence, a 
subject with a good (bad) signal who receives conflicting good and bad signal reports from 
her fellow group members will not regard these as cancelling out, but instead will overweight 
the good (bad) signal report, increase (decrease) her subjective probability that the state is 
good and adjust her investment accordingly. Thus, while decision-making consistent with 
Bayesian updating does not predict any systematic change of behavior after receiving 
conflicting signals, confirmation bias does.6 
 
3.2.2. Group Decisions  
In stage III, one group member’s decision is randomly selected to be the one that is relevant 
for all three group members. Our use of this random dictatorship procedure implies that each 
group member has an incentive to truthfully reveal her preferred investment choice for the 
group. Note that this procedure does not force group members to compromise or reach 
                                                            
6
 As noted earlier, our Bayesian updating predictions assume that subjects believe that others report their signals 
truthfully. If we relax this assumption by allowing subjects to distrust all signals by others to some (but the same) 
extent, we still expect subjects to weight conflicting signals equally. For these subjects, the prediction consistent 
with Bayesian updating is that investment in stages II and IV will be the same (e.g. if subjects simply see both 
signals as ‘cheap talk’ then they should discount both of them entirely). Subjects may also have more sophisticated 
suspicions, such as distrusting reports of good signals generally (which means we should see behavior consistent 
with confirmation bias for those with bad signals and behavior consistent with ‘reverse confirmation bias’ for 
those with good signals) or suspicions stemming from communication with specific subjects (in which case 
predictions are less clear cut).  
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consensus. Nor does it imply that a subject should make the same decision that she would if 
she were the only affected party. 
 However, there are two reasons why consensus might emerge in stage III of our 
COMM treatment. First, it may reflect that subjects have other-regarding concerns and prefer 
compromise rather than forcing their own preferences on others. Second, subjects may be 
persuaded by the discussion during the stage that a particular investment choice is actually 
preferable from an individual perspective.  
In order to see how far stage III decisions depart from the decision that an individual 
would make if she were making that decision in isolation (i.e when her decision is not 
observed by others and does not affect others), we also have subjects make individual, 
isolated, decisions in stage IV. Notice that subjects have precisely the same information as in 
stage III, but their decision will only affect themselves. If a subject makes different decisions 
in stages III and IV this suggests that their stage III decisions reflect some form of social 
preferences over risk. Another possible effect of group deliberation is persuasion: subjects’ 
level of risk-taking in stage IV may be influenced by persuasive arguments from fellow group 
members in stage III, in which case subjects’ individual decisions in stage IV will be shaped 
by the decisions made in stage III. Such a result would be in line with the findings of Sutter 
(2009), who finds that deciding as part of a group leads subjects to increase their risk taking 
compared to individual decisions taken before group membership, without reverting to lower 
risk taking in individual decisions afterwards. 
Notice that there are two differences between stages III and IV of our COMM 
treatment. One is that subjects make decisions for the group in stage III and for themselves in 
stage IV. The other is that they communicate freely with other group members in stage III. 
Our NO-COMM treatment controls for the effect of communication.  
4. Results 
4.1 Information and Individual Investments 
We start by looking at decisions from the first two stages, as these provide useful information 
on heterogeneity in individual risk attitudes. For these stages we pool the data from the 
  
13 
 
COMM and NO-COMM treatments.7 Figure 1 shows the distribution of investment decisions 
in stage I (upper panel) and stage 2, conditional on the private signal received (two bottom 
panels). In stage I, about 20% of subjects make a choice consistent with risk-neutrality and 
invest £5, and a similar percentage make an extremely risk averse choice investing nothing to 
guarantee £10. There is considerable heterogeneity, and the majority of subjects display risk 
aversion.  In stage II, subjects with good signals tend to invest more than subjects with bad 
signals, but again, for both signal types there is considerable heterogeneity.  
 
[ Figure 1 here ] 
 
If we look at how individuals react to their signals we see that the majority of subjects 
respond in an intuitive way. Figure 2 shows that subjects tend to increase their investment in 
response to a good signal or decrease it in response to a bad signal.8 However, some subjects 
do not respond as much as Bayesian rationality would suggest. Indeed, 63 of 180 subjects did 
not change their investment choice. 
 
[ Figure 2 here ] 
 
Further analysis of how subjects react to new information can be based on comparing 
stage II and stage IV decisions, since in stage IV subjects will have new information from the 
stage III group interaction. Assuming that efficient information aggregation takes place, e.g. if 
subjects report signals truthfully and believe the reports of others, this new information gives 
each subject three independent signals on the state of the world. Although our design does not 
enforce truthful reporting and allows subjects to misreport or withhold signals we find that the 
vast majority of the subjects truthfully report their signals.9 
                                                            
7
 The experimental procedures and instructions are identical up to stage III, and subjects are not given instructions 
for stage III until after they have completed stage II. However, a considerable time elapsed between conducting the 
treatments and so we tested for the legitimacy of pooling. Using two-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests we fail to find 
any significant treatment differences between the treatments in these stages: p = 0.5408 (stage I), p = 0.7068 (stage 
II conditional on a bad signal) and p = 0.2674 (stage II conditional on a good signal). 
8
 Only 12 of 180 subjects modified their behavior in the opposite way. 
9
 In the COMM treatment there is one group where a  member claims that there is “no point discussing what 
[signals] we got because we all could have picked the same card” and the others agree. The group proceeds to 
discuss their decision without considering the signals. In the NO-COMM treatment two subjects misreported a bad 
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Figure 3 shows how subjects who received two new identical signals react to this new 
information. Here we present the data from the two treatments separately. The picture in both 
treatments is similar. Subjects receiving two new bad signals should decrease (or at least not 
increase) investments relative to stage II, based on a higher posterior probability of the bad 
state occurring. Only 3 of 27 (COMM) and 3 of 45 (NO- COMM) subjects reacted in a 
contrarian manner. Analogously, subjects receiving two new good signals should increase (or 
at least not decrease) investments. Only 3 of 20 (COMM) and 2 of 13 (NO-COMM) subjects 
reacted in a contrarian manner. Thus, although we cannot rule out that some subjects discount 
others’ signals to some extent, the majority of subjects react to new information in an intuitive 
way. 
 
[ Figure 3 here ] 
 
4.2 Bayesian Rationality versus Confirmation Bias 
So far, we have only considered situations in which Bayesian rationality and confirmation 
bias cannot be separated as explanations of increasing or decreasing risk-taking across stages 
of our experiment. But when subjects receive conflicting signals from their fellow group 
members, the predictions differ. According to Bayesian updating, a subject receiving one 
good and one bad signal should not alter her level of investment. By contrast, confirmation 
bias stipulates that a signal received from a fellow group member is given more weight if it 
confirms the subject’s private signal. If those with a good (bad) private signal increase 
(decrease) their investment in stage IV relative to stage II, this means that subjects display 
confirmation bias. 
 Consistent with Bayesian rationality 14 of 34 (COMM) and 15 of 32 (NO-COMM) 
subjects make the same choice in stages II and IV. However, most subjects change their 
investments. Figure 4 compares investment decisions for those subjects receiving conflicting 
signals from their fellow group members, with the left (right) panels showing decisions of 
subjects with bad (good) private signals, and the top (bottom) panels showing data from the 
COMM (NO-COMM) treatments. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
signal. For the remainder of the paper we exclude the three groups concerned, but our results are unaffected if we 
include these observations. 
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[ Figure 4 here ] 
 
In the COMM treatment (top panels), when subjects are allowed to communicate in stage III, 
we see that those with a bad private signal tend to increase their investment, whereas in the 
right panel we see that those with a good private signal tend to decrease their investment. Of 
the 20 subjects who change investments 5 adjust in the direction predicted by confirmation 
bias and 15 adjust in the opposite direction. Thus more subjects exhibit reverse confirmation 
bias than confirmation bias or Bayesian rationality. The bottom two panels refer to the NO-
COMM treatment and show a slightly different picture: 9 subjects adjust in the direction 
predicted by confirmation bias and 8 in the opposite direction. Thus removing the opportunity 
to communicate appears to reduce the incidence of reverse confirmation bias. 
For a formal test of whether there is a systematic change in the direction predicted by 
confirmation bias we measure the change in investment as the stage IV decision minus the 
stage II decision for subjects with good signals, and the stage II decision minus the stage IV 
decision for subjects with bad signals. Bayesian updating implies that these changes should be 
zero, whereas confirmation bias implies positive changes. A two-tailed Mann-Whitney sign-
rank test of the pooled data rejects the hypothesis that the median change is zero for the 
COMM treatment (n = 34, p = 0.0286), but not for the NO-COMM treatment (n = 32, p = 
0.8497). Thus the deviations from Bayesian rationality are systematic in the COMM 
treatment, but evidently this is because there is a tendency for changes away from one’s own 
signal, i.e. reverse confirmation bias.10 
 
4.3 Group Effects 
At the beginning of stage III subjects receive new information about the state of the world 
from their fellow group members. They then make an investment decision and one group 
member’s choice is randomly selected to implement the group decision. For each group we 
calculate the average investment decision and, as a measure of within-group variability in 
investment decisions, the mean absolute deviation from the average of the three investment 
                                                            
10
 The test assumes the changes in investment decisions are independent across the subjects who received conflicting 
signals from others. However, in each mixed signal group there are two subjects with conflicting signals and it is 
possible that their decisions in stage IV, after communicating with one another in stage III, are correlated. Thus we 
also ran the test for the COMM treatment using the average change for these pairs (i.e. with 17 observations). There 
is still systematic evidence of reverse confirmation bias (p= 0.0344).  
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decisions. Table 2 reports the averages of these measures across groups for each signal profile 
and treatment.  
[Table 2 here] 
 
While the average level of risk-taking increases monotonically with the number of 
good signals, there is no consistent treatment effect. Thus, communication does not have a 
systematic effect on levels of risk-taking. However, within-group variability is lower in the 
COMM treatment for any signal profile.11 The low within-group variability in the COMM 
treatment is due to a striking degree of consensus within groups. Indeed, in 14 out of 27 
groups all three group members submitted an identical decision. By comparison, in the NO-
COMM treatment consensus was observed in only 6 of 30 groups. 
Communication may lead to consensus in group decision making via two alternative 
mechanisms. First, decisions may reflect social preferences over risk, whereby subjects make 
choices that they would not make in an individual decision-making context. For example, 
subjects may prefer to conform, driven by pressure from peers or a concern for the risk 
preferences of other group members. Second, decisions may be the result of persuasive 
arguments, whereby subjects are influenced by the group discussion and may reflect an 
agreement on what is the preferable option. By examining decisions in stage IV we can 
examine the influence of these two mechanisms. If consensus in stage III decisions only 
reflects social preferences over risk we would expect subjects’ decisions in stage III and stage 
IV to differ. If subjects were persuaded by fellow group members that a particular decision is 
preferable then we would expect subjects to choose similar levels of risk-taking in stages III 
and IV. 
Before comparing stages, we first present investment decisions from stage IV in Table 
3. Analogously to Table 2, we present average investments and the average within-group 
variability of investments across groups with a given signal profile.12 As with stage III, 
investment levels are not significantly different across treatments (two-tailed Mann-Whitney 
                                                            
11
 For statistical treatment comparisons we use two-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests using the group as the unit of 
observation. Note that some of these comparisons are based on very few observations. Nevertheless, we find no 
significant treatment differences in the level of investment for any signal profile (p>0.1 in all comparisons), 
while we do find significant differences in the within-group variability (p=0.0087 in the case of one good signal 
and p = 0.0598 in the case of two good signals). 
12
 To be clear, subjects are making individual decisions in stage IV without any group interaction, but we measure 
variability relative to the stage III grouping structure for comparison with stage III.  
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U tests, p > 0.1 for all signal profiles). In contrast to stage III however, we find no treatment 
effect with regard to within-group variability (p > 0.1 for all signal profiles). 
 
[Table 3 here] 
  
For comparing Tables 2 and 3 we use Wilcoxon signed-rank tests taking the group 
change across stages III and IV as the unit of analysis, pooling across signal profiles. We find 
no significant differences in average investments (p = 0.6068 for COMM; p = 0.6036 for NO-
COMM), or in within-group variability in the NO-COMM treatment (p = 0.4601). However 
there is a significant increase in within-group variability in the COMM treatment (p = 
0.0002). 
The significant increase in within-group variability from stage III to IV of the COMM 
treatment is accompanied by a reduction in the amount of “consensus”. We find only one of 
27 groups made identical choices. Thus while in stage III many subjects chose to enter the 
same decision as that of fellow group members, once they reached stage IV they tended to “do 
their own thing”. This suggests that at least part of the consensus in stage III was due to social 
preferences over risk. 
In order to examine whether there is any influence of the stage III group interaction on 
decisions we regressed investment decisions on group dummies for each signal profile. The 
R2 statistics from these regressions are presented in Table 4. Note that in the NO-COMM 
treatment the dummy variables are insignificant. In the COMM treatments the group dummies 
are highly significant in stage III, reflecting that the variability of individuals’ investment 
choices about group means is substantially lower than the variability about the overall mean. 
In stage IV the explanatory power of the group dummies is reduced, but not eliminated. Thus, 
even though the incidence of consensus is reduced subject choices within groups are highly 
correlated, offering support for the persuasive arguments mechanism. Group communication 
has a lasting impact on subject choices.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
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5. Conclusion 
We report the results of an experiment designed to help understand how groups aggregate 
information that is relevant for decision-making in risky environments. In our experiment 
subjects receive information from two sources: from observing private signals and from other 
group members. In the latter case we vary group communication, allowing group members to 
either freely communicate or restricting them to simple direct reports of information. 
 Our analysis of the experimental results produces two main findings. First, while the 
behavior of many subjects is consistent with Bayesian rationality, a considerable number of 
subjects exhibited ‘reverse confirmation bias’. That is, they seem to place less weight on 
information from others that agrees with their private signal and more weight on conflicting 
information. We find that this tendency is particularly pronounced when subjects communicate 
freely. When subjects cannot communicate freely, the incidence of reverse confirmation bias 
reduces to the same level as confirmation bias. As far as we are aware this phenomenon has not 
been documented before. There are different ways of interpreting the change of investment away 
from one’s private signal after talking to others. One explanation is that the subject somehow 
places more weight on the signal different from her own after a group discussion. This could be 
driven by a probability heuristic acquired in the group discussion or by the verbal report of a 
signal contradicting one’s own coming across as more credible. An alternative explanation is that 
the subject has become convinced, in the course of the discussion with others, that she has 
overweighted her own signal in her stage II decision. Distinguishing between competing 
explanations is an interesting topic for further research. 
Second, when subjects can communicate freely we observe a striking degree of 
consensus: in most groups all members make the same choice. The pattern of choices across 
different stages of the experiment suggests that the high degree of group consensus is partly due 
to persuasive arguments of other group members and partly due to social preferences over risk.  
Altogether, our results indicate a remarkably high level of trust in the information and 
opinions communicated by others. The high level of trust placed in others may reflect certain 
features of our experimental design. Because our subjects have no experience with the 
experimental task we use, and all subjects receive the same outcome in stage III, there appears to 
be little incentive to act strategically. Perhaps if subjects would receive different outcomes (e.g. a 
smaller or greater part of their earnings was determined by the state of the world), or if subjects 
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would play multiple rounds of the game with feedback, they would be tempted to misreport their 
private information and be less inclined to agree with others. Furthermore, the process of 
obtaining private information in our experiment was entirely transparent – if it was less clear 
where others’ information came from, subjects might have been more suspicious. Varying the 
degree of pay-off commonality and the (perceived) quality of private information also seem 
promising directions for further research. 
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Appendix: Experimental instructions 
N.B.: Introductory instructions and instructions for Stages I, II and IV are identical across 
treatments, whereas stage III instructions differ and are printed separately per treatment. 
Introduction (both treatments) 
Welcome to our experimental study of decision-making. The experiment will take about 45 
minutes. The instructions for the experiment are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you 
can earn a considerable amount of money. The money you earn will be paid to you, privately and 
in cash, immediately after the experiment. You are not allowed to talk to other subjects during 
the experiment, and you are not allowed to look at any computer screen but your own; anyone 
who is found breaking these rules will be dismissed without payment. 
The experiment consists of four stages. In each of the four stages, we will ask you to submit a 
decision. Your earnings will depend on your decision in only ONE of the four stages; the 
decisions in the other three stages will not affect your earnings. The experimenter will now 
randomly determine the stage that will count for your earnings. We have four playing cards: the 
ace, 2, 3 and 4 of spades - these represent the four stages of the experiment. [Experimenter shows 
cards to subjects.] We will shuffle them and one will be picked at random. The selected card will 
go back in the box and will remain here until the end of the experiment. [Randomly chosen 
subject blindly picks playing card in front of other subjects.] You will not know which one of the 
stages will count until the end. You should therefore consider your decision carefully in every 
stage, since, as far as you can tell, any stage could be the one that counts for your earnings. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions during the experiment. An experimenter will 
then come to you and privately answer your question. 
Your earnings from the experiment depend on your decisions, and which of two card sets is 
randomly selected by the experimenter. The two sets are pictured on the whiteboard. As you can 
see, set A contains 2 red cards and 1 black card; set B contains 2 black cards and 1 red card. The 
experimenter will now select the set of cards; this selection will be relevant to all four stages of 
the experiment. The experimenter will not announce the selected card set to anyone until the end 
of the experiment. [Show card sets to subjects.] We will now put each of them in a box, and put 
these boxes in a bag. We will now shuffle them, and pick one of the sets at random. [Randomly 
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chosen subject blindly picks box with card set in front of other subjects.] 
Stage I (both treatments) 
You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. Your earnings will depend on 
your choice and whether card set A or card set B has been selected. You make a choice by 
selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ button. 
You will have 5 minutes to make a decision. Keep in mind that, if this stage has been selected for 
pay-out, you will be paid according to the decision you are about to make. Please raise your hand 
if you have a question. 
Stage II (both treatments) 
Each person will now privately receive a clue about which card set has been selected. We will do 
this by letting you draw a card from the selected set, allowing you to see if its red or black, then 
putting it back in the set before the next person draws a card. Your clue is private in the sense 
that only you observe it. Other subjects cannot see the card you draw. Please note that we will 
ask you to input your clue on the computer screen immediately after your draw. 
We will now go around and give each of you your private clue. Please keep your eyes in your 
own cubicle and wait until the experimenter comes to you, draw a card from the set, look at it, 
then input it on your screen. You are not allowed to observe other people’s clues. 
You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. Your earnings will depend on 
your choice and whether card set A or card set B has been selected. You make a choice by 
selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ button. 
You will have 5 minutes to make a decision. Keep in mind that, if this stage has been selected for 
pay-out, you will be paid according to the decision you are about to make. Please raise your hand 
if you have a question. 
Stage III (treatment COMM) 
In this stage you will be randomly matched with two other subjects to form a group of three. 
  
26 
 
Before you make any decision, you will get 5 minutes to communicate with your fellow group 
members through a chat box on your screen. You are free to discuss any aspect of the experiment 
that you wish, as long as you follow these rules: 
• You must not reveal any personal information (for example, your name, contact details or 
seat in the room) 
• You must not make any threats, insults or use otherwise offensive language 
If you violate these rules your payment will be forfeited. 
After the chat you must choose one of the 11 options from the table below (which will be 
displayed on your screen during the chat). One of the three decisions in your group will be 
randomly selected and all group members will be paid according to this decision. This means 
that each member of your group will earn the same amount. At the end of this stage, you will be 
informed of each group member’s decision and which one of the three group members’ decisions 
has been selected. 
You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. The earnings of each member 
of your group will depend on which of the three group members’ choices will be selected and 
whether card set A or card set B has been selected. You make a choice by selecting a single 
option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ button. You will have 5 minutes to make a decision. 
Please raise your hand if you have a question. 
One of the group members’ choices will be randomly selected and implemented for the entire 
group. Keep in mind that, if this stage has been selected for pay-out, you will be paid according 
to the selected decision. 
Stage III (treatment NO-COMM) 
In this stage you will be randomly matched with two other subjects to form a group of three. You 
can report your clue to your fellow group members (we will ask you to choose one of the 
alternatives on your screen). Before you make a decision in this stage, you will see the clues 
reported by yourself and the two other members of your group.  
 
After seeing the clues reported by you and your fellow group members you must choose one of 
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the 11 options from the table below (which will be displayed on your screen). One of the three 
decisions in your group will be randomly selected and all group members will be paid according 
to this decision. This means that each member of your group will earn the same amount. At the 
end of this stage, you will be informed of each group member’s decision and which one of the 
three group members’ decisions has been selected. 
You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below (options are the same as in the 
previous stages). The earnings of each member of your group will depend on which of the three 
group members’ choices will be selected and whether card set A or card set B has been selected. 
You make a choice by selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ button. You 
will have 5 minutes to make a decision. Please raise your hand if you have a question. 
One of the group members’ choices will be randomly selected and implemented for the entire 
group. Keep in mind that, if this stage has been selected for pay-out, you will be paid according 
to the decision you are about to make. 
Stage IV (both treatments) 
In this part of the experiment, you must make another decision, this time individually. You must 
choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. Your earnings will depend on your 
choice and whether card set A or card set B has been selected. You make a choice by selecting a 
single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ button. You will have 5 minutes to make a 
decision.  
Keep in mind that, if this stage has been selected for pay-out, you will be paid according to the 
decision you are about to make. Please raise your hand if you have a question. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Investment Choices and Earnings 
Investment (£) Earnings (£) 
 good state bad state 
0 10 10 
1 12.80 9 
2 15.40 8 
3 17.80 7 
4 19.60 6 
5 20.80 5 
6 21.60 4 
7 22.40 3 
8 22.80 2 
9 23.20 1 
10 23.60 0 
 
  
  
29 
 
Table 2. Stage III Investment Decisions 
 Average Mean Absolute Deviation 
Number of 
good signals 
COMM NO-COMM COMM NO-COMM 
0 0.89 0.72 0.30 0.85 
 (n=6) (n=13) (n=6) (n=13) 
1 1.70 1.83 0.15 1.44 
 (n=9) (n=6) (n=9) (n=6) 
2 3.17 4.27 0.72 1.44 
 (n=8) (n=10) (n=8) (n=10) 
3 5.42 5.00 0.56 3.33 
 (n=4) (n=1) (n=4) (n=1) 
 
Table 3. Stage IV Investment Decisions 
 Average Mean Absolute deviation 
Number of 
good signals 
COMM NO-COMM COMM NO-COMM 
0 0.89 0.79 0.59 0.91 
 (n=6) (n=13) (n=6) (n=13) 
1 2.00 2.17 0.79 0.96 
 (n=9) (n=6) (n=9) (n=6) 
2 2.83 3.67 1.13 0.96 
 (n=8) (n=10) (n=8) (n=10) 
3 5.58 4.67 1.16 2.88 
 (n=4) (n=1) (n=4) (n=1) 
 
  
  
30 
 
 
Table 4. Proportion of variability in investments explained by group dummies. 
 COMM NO-COMM 
Number of 
good signals 
Stage III Stage IV Stage III Stage IV 
0 74*** 44 25 21 
1 95*** 54** 31 49 
2 70*** 60** 36 42 
3 91*** 70** n.a. n.a. 
Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***) level based on F-
tests of joint significance of group dummies. 
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Figure 1: Distributions of individual investments in stages I and II. 
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Figure 2: Stage I (pre-private signal) versus Stage II (post-private signal) investments. 
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Figure 3: Stage II (pre-information sharing) versus Stage IV (post-information 
sharing) investments by subjects receiving two identical signals from others. 
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Figure 4: Stage II (pre-information sharing) versus Stage IV (post-information 
sharing) investments by subjects receiving two conflicting signals from others. 
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Risk Taking and Information Aggregation in Groups 
April 22, 2015 
Highlights 
• We report an experiment on risk taking and information aggregation in groups 
• Subjects show a high degree of trust in information reported by others 
• Group interaction leads to ‘reverse confirmation bias’, but only with 
communication 
• Group communication leads to a high level of consensus 
